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SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW

This survey of California law, a regular feature of
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions of special importance to women. A brief
analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised
in each case is provided.
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A.

CRIMINAL LAW
RAPE

Testimony of defendant's psychiatrist in child abuse
case held to be privileged despite Child Abuse Reporting Act.
1.

People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 431 (1983). In People v. Stritzinger, the court held that
testimony of the defendant's psychiatrist obtained pursuant to
the Child Abuse Reporting Act} was erroneously admitted at
trial in violation of the psycotherapist-patient privilege. 2
The defendant and his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, Sarah, sought treatment from a licensed clinical psychologist after
the defendant allegedly engaged in various acts of fondling, mutual masturbation, and oral copulation with the child. In the
course of her individual therapy, Sarah revealed that she had
engaged in sexual activity with the defendant. The therapist reported the conversation to the child welfare agency that same
afternoon, and indicated that he was scheduled to meet with the
defendant later the same day. Despite expressed reservations
about disclosing defendant's confidential communications, the
therapist revealed the substance of his session with defendant
when requested to do so in a follow-up inquiry by the investigating sheriff's deputy. The therapist was advised by the deputy
that the Child Abuse Reporting Act provided an applicable exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 3
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165-11174 (Deering Supp. 1984).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (Deering Supp. 1984). The court also held that the
mother's testimony concerning the child's emotional difficulties was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that the child was unavailable as a witness and that therefore, the child's preliminary hearing testimony was erroneously admitted into evidence.
34 Cal. 3d 505, 519, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 441 (1983).
3. The applicable exception is codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 11171(b) (Deering
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At trial, the defendant sought to have the therapist's testimony excluded on the basis of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court held that Penal Code section 11171 (b)4 creates
an exception to the privilege and ruled the testimony admissible.
The defendant was convicted of multiple counts of child molestation; the defendant appealed.
Section 1014 of the California Evidence Code ll provides that
a patient, whether or not a party to a lawsuit, has a privilege to
refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist.
However, to encourage the prompt investigation and prosecution
of child abuse, the legislature carved out an exception to the
statutory physician-patient privileges. Section 11171(b) provides
in pertinent part: "Neither the physician-patient privilege nor
the psychotherapist-patient privileges applies to information reported pursuant to this article in any court proceeding or administrative hearing."6
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is codified in California Evidence Code section 1014.7 Section 1014 provides in part:
"The patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to
disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential
communication between patient and psychotherapist. . . ."8 As
a matter of policy, California courts have broadly construed section 1014 in favor of the patient,9 although no prior cases have
dealt specifically with the exception provided in section
11171(b). In In re Lifschutz/ o the court, in construing the patient-litigant exception l l to the privilege, recognized the constitutional dimension of the privilege as well as the general need
for confidentiality in psychotherapy, but held that the privilege
Supp. 1984).
4.Id.
5. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (Deering Supp. 1984).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11171(b) (Deering Supp. 1984).
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (Deering Supp. 1984).
8.Id.
9. See Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 508 P.2d 309, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309
(1973); Grosslight v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1977).
10. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829.
11. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1016 (Deering 1966).
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is not absolute and must yield to compelling state interests. 12
The Stritzinger court noted that the clear legislative intent
in the enactment of the Child Abuse Reporting Act is to protect
children, and further, that this government concern is compelling. Therefore, the court stated that section 11171(b) creates a
specific exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but
that the exception was erroneously applied under the facts In
Stritzinger.
The court found that Sarah's communications with the
therapist were not privileged, were required to be reported
under the Act, and were admissible at trial. It also determined,
however, that the second report, that of the defendant's communications, at most only confirmed the therapist's earlier report
and was not required to be disclosed under the Child Abuse Reporting Act. The court concluded that it would be inappropriate
to apply the subdivision (b) exception to the second report and
therefore did not allow admission of the evidence at trial.
The court stated that if the psychiatrist was compelled to go
beyond an initial report under such circumstances,
candor and integrity would require the doctor to
advise the patient at the outset that he will violate his confidence. . . . Under such circumstances it is impossible to conceive of any meaningful therapy. Ironically, in this case medical
help was initially what this distraught family
sought as a result of these tragic events. IS

Justice Kaus concurred with the majority's holding that the
testimony was admitted in error, but correctly disagreed with
the majority's reasoning. He argued that the majority erroneously based its determination that the second report was optional on the fact that it did not yield any new information. The
solution to the conflict between patient's privacy concerns and
the 11171(b) exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
according to Justice Kaus, is to apply the concept of waiver. Jus12. The Lifschutz court concluded that Evidence Code section 1016 compels disclosure of only those matters which the patient has chosen to reveal by referring to them in
litigation. 2 Cal. 3d at 432, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
13. 34 Cal. 3d at 514, 668 P.2d at 744-45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
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tice Kaus would prohibit the therapist from testifying to confidential communications from the defendant-patient unless the
proponent of the evidence first establishes that the patient,
before talking to the therapist, had been made aware of the
therapist's statutory duty to testify.
The majority found the excuse of the privilege obviously abhorrent in a voluntary family therapy situation such as Stritzinger, involving the admission of the defendant's own incriminating statements. The court, however, paid lip service to the
constitutional concerns presented by the psychotherapist-patient privilege rather than offering any rules for proper application of the exception beyond the facts of Stritzinger. 14 Justice
Kaus' proposed waiver rule seems to be a workable approach to
legislation that has placed psychotherapists in a double bind
which neither promotes effective therapy nor leads to successful
prosecutions in family sexual abuse cases.
II.

FAMILY LAW

A.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

Payments arising from "income protection" insurance
policy are community property.
1.

In re Marriage of Donnelly, 142 Cal. App. 3d 135, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 756 (1st Dist. 1983). In In re Marriage of Donnelly, the
court of appeal characterized payments arising from an "income
protection" insurance policy as community property to the extent that community funds contributed toward the premiums.
14. Justice Kaus wrote:
It may be unfair to mention it-we have to take our cases as
they come along-but something else which bothers me about
the majority opinion is that it really does not decide anything
except this case. Even if the facts supported the majority's
conclusion, Dr. Walker would have been free to testify to defendant's confidences if he had seen defendant before Sarah,
or if defendant had related more serious or more frequent sexual misconduct than Sarah.
[d. at 523 n.4, 668 P.2d at 750 n.4, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 444 n.4.
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During marriage, the husband took out an "income protection" insurance policy using community earnings to pay the premiums. The policy became payable upon the husband's total
disability. Husband sustained job related injuries while still living with his wife but the injuries did not culminate in total disability until after the parties separated. Upon dissolu~ion of the
marriage, the wife claimed a community property interest in the
policy. The husband argued that the payments were his separate
property because they derived from his post-separation disability rather than from pre-separation labor. The trial court rejected the husband's contention and he appealed.
In support of his position, the husband cited In re Marriage
of Jones 15 and In re Marriage of Flockhart. 16 In Jones, the California Supreme Court held that disability pay is not a community asset because it is not compensation resulting from past services rendered. Rather, it is compensation for loss of present and
future earning capacity and personal anguish resulting from a
disabled status. The benefits at issue in Flockhart derived from
a statute 17 enacted to protect laid off park employees. The
Flockhart court reasoned that the statutory benefits did not
stem from a contractual right in consideration for services previously rendered but, instead, represented present compensation
for lost income, and therefore were analogous to disability payments. 18 Thus, the court in Flockhart held that the weekly layoff
benefits were not community property.
The Donnelly court disagreed with the husband and
pointed out that in In re Marriage of Brown/ 9 the California
Supreme Court had disapproved Jones. In Jones, the disability
payments came from a fund contributed to by the employee
rather than being gratuitous. For this reason, the Brown court
likened them to pensions which had not yet vested. Brown held:
15. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
16. 119 Cal. App. 3d 240, 173 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1981).
17. Redwood Employee Protection Program Act, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163
(1978) (tit. I codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ la-I, 79b, 79c, 79c·l, 79k-79q (1982) tit.
II not codified (1982)).
18. However, it is arguable that the right did accrue because of past contributed
labor. Legislative creation of a compensation plan does not negate the fact that the right
to receive benefits under it would not exist but for past contributed labor, nor does it
preclude the plan having been created to induce or compensate for such labor.
19. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
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"[P]ension rights, whether or not vested, represent a property
interest; to the extent that such rights derive from employment
during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to
division in a dissolution proceeding. "20
The Donnelly court pointed out that the "income protection" insurance policy contracted for during the marriage had
been privately purchased, its provisions called for the payment
of a flat sum over a fixed term, and it was maintained entirely
with private funds. In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bank of
Italy,21 the court held that'a life insurance policy, when purchased during marriage and maintained with community earnings, is a community asset and therefore subject to equal division upon marital dissolution. Likening the income protection
policy in Donnelly to a life insurance policy, the Donnelly court
applied the rule stated in New York Life Insurance Co. and held
the income protection policy to be community property.
The court in Donnelly looked past the label of the plan to
distinguish between "contributed to" plans, such as pensions
and life insurance policies, and gratuitous plans derived solely
from the benevolence of the employer. Thus, looking beyond the
"disability plan" label, the court based its holding that the plan
was community property upon the actual characteristics of the
plan and upon a determination that community labor contributed toward its creation and/or maintenance. The court's result
is consistent with the community property scheme in California-to divide equally those assets which are derived from the
community and therefore belong to the community.
2. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act is
retroactive to date of issuance of McCarty decision.

In re Marriage of Hopkins, 142 Cal. App. 3d 350, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 70 (2nd Dist. 1983). The Court of Appeal in In re Marriage of Hopkins, upheld a trial court's division of a military
pension as community property.
20. [d. at 842, 544 P.2d at 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
21. 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 P. 61 (,1923).
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In a December 1980 dissolution proceeding, the trial court
found a husband's military retirement pension to be subject to
community property division. The husband appealed. Although
the court found the trial court's decision to be an appropriate
application of California law as it existed at the time, it analyzed
the decision in light of the 1981 case McCarty u. McCarty 22 and
the 1982 enactment of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act (the Act).23
Prior to McCarty, it was well settled in California that military pensions Were community assets subject to division in dissolution proceedings. This principle is the Fithian doctrine. 24 In
June 1981, the United States Supreme Court in McCarty u. McCarty, overruled the Fithian line of cases by holding that congressional goals in creating a federal retirement plan had preempted the field of community classification by state courts and
that a community property division of such pay frustrated congressional objectives. In September 1982, Congress enacted the
Act. The Act effectively overruled McCarty and gave state
courts the power to divide military pensions as community property.25 The effect of the Act on California law is to reinstate the
Fithian doctrine.
On the issue of the retroactivity of the Act, the court first
noted that, in at least one other California court of appeal decision, In re Marriage of Fellers,26 McCarty had been held not to
be retroactive to cases final before it was decided. The Fellers
court had reviewed the ramifications of giving McCarty retroactive effect: "[It] would flaunt the rule of res judicata, upset settled property distributions on which parties have planned their
lives and unsettle judgments entered as long as 40 years ago."27
In re Marriage of Hopkins, on the other hand, was not final
•
when McCarty
was decided and was still pending appeal on the
22. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
23. Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §
1408).
24. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974)
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 925 (1974).
25. For a more detailed history of McCarty and the Act, see Survey: Women and
California Law, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 763-65 (1982) and Survey: Women and California Law, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 744-45 (1983).
26. 125 Cal. App. 3d 254, 178 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1981).
27. Id. at 257, 178 Cal. Rptr; at 37.
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effective date of the Act. The Hopkins court stated three factors
to be considered in determining retroactivity: "the extent of
public reliance upon the former rule; the ability of litigants to
foresee the coming change in· the law and whether retroactive
application of the rule could produce substantial inequitable
results. "28
The court reasoned that public reliance on the Fithian doctrine was extensive because the Fithian decision was almost ten
years old when McCarty was decided, whereas r~liance on McCarty had been short-lived. Therefore, it held that to extend the
retroactivity of the Act would facilitate, rather than frustrate,
the well-ordered functions of the law in this area.
The court also pointed out that it had not been apparent
that the United States Supreme Court would reverse the California Supreme Court in McCarty, since it had denied certiorari
to In re Marriage of Fithian, which had presented an identical
issue. 29 Thus, there was no way for an attorney to predict the
change McCarty presented. The court noted further that the issue had been continually before Congress since 1969, making it
reasonable for a litigant to anticipate legislative suppression of
McCarty.
Finally, the court stated that to refuse to give the Act retroactive effect would produce inequitable results in that some of
those entitled to a share of a military pension would not receive
it merely because of the existence of a short-lived decision that
stands in direct conflict with clear congressional intent. Therefore, the court held the Act to be retroactive to the date of issuance of the McCarty decision, thereby fully reinstating.pre-McCarty law. In so doing, the court brings continuity and stability
to an area of the law that previously had been characterized by
rapid and conflicting change.
28. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 357, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
29. Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974) cert. denied, 419
U.S. 825 (1974).

WOMEN'S LAW FORUM

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss3/16

10

et al.: California Law Survey

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

1984]

3.

795

Term life insurance policy not community property.

In Re Marriage of Lorenz, 146 Cal. App. 3d 464, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 237 (2nd Dist. 1983). In In Re Marriage of Lorenz, the
court held that a husband's term life insurance policies were not
community assets subject to division upon dissolution, since the
policies had no monetary value.

In the dissolution proceeding, the trial court determined
that the husband's two life insurance policies had no cash value.
Both policies were term policies having a face value of $10,000
each. One policy was a Veterans Administration policy and the
other was issued through the husband's employer. The husband
was the named insured in both policies. The wife appealed, urging that term insurance policies on the husband's life were a
community asset.
Courts have generally recognized the value of whole life insurance as its cash surrender value, and have divided that value
when the policy is determined to be community property.30 Prior
to In re Marriage of Lorenz, however, no California cases had
addressed the divisibility of term life insurance policies, which
are generally accepted as having no value. 31
In formulating its holding, the court analyzed and contrasted conflicting California court of appeal cases. In Biltoft v.
Wootten,32 the court held that the proceeds of a term life insurance policy must be apportioned between community property
and separate property in the same ratio as the amount paid for
the premiums from community earnings bore to the amount
from separate property. Biltoft involved a contest between the
former wife and the daughter-beneficiary of the decedent over
the proceeds of the policy acquired during marriage. The marriage had since been dissolved, but the court of appeal based its
30. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Holmgren, 60 Cal. App. 3d 869, 130 Cal. Rptr. 440
(1976).
31. Whole life insurance differs from term life insurance both in value and benefits.
For instance, term life insurance has no cash surrender value and generally furnishes
protection for only a specified or limited period of time. Also, the premium for whole life
insurance remains the same throughout the life of the policyholder, whereas the premium for term insurance increases with the age of the insured. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
723-24 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
32. 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1979).
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characterization of the policy proceeds on the marital status of
the insured at the time the insurance was acquired and on the
fact that community funds were used to purchase the policies.
Todd u. Todd sS and In Re Marriage of AufmuthS4 established that some property rights, such as education, are intangible and incapable of monetary valuation for division between
spouses in divorce proceedings. On the other hand, the Lorenz
court recognized that some intangibles, such as contingent retirement benefits and non-vested pension rights, have been held
to be divisible property under community property statutes. 311

The Lorenz court cited Todd for the proposition that an asset, in order to be divided within the meaning of community
property laws, must be "of such a character that a monetary
value can be placed upon it. "36 The court concluded that the
term insurance policies are not convertible into cash, that no
monetary value can be placed upon them, and that the assets
are therefore not divisible on dissolution of the marriage.
With little discussion, the Lorenz court distinguished
Biltoft, stating: "The proceeds or benefits of the policy of
course, have a value. However, until those benefits are payable,
the policy is worthless. "37 The court therefore concluded that
the trial court had properly ruled that the term life insurance
policies were not community property subject to division on dissolution of ~arriage.
The court in Lorenz took an analytical approach that fails
to recognize or preserve any prospective community interest in
term life insurance benefits, or to acknowledge that such benefits may have had their origin in community funds. The distinctions between policy proceeds and the policy itself, and between
term and whole life benefits, certainly merit more discussion
than the Lorenz court afforded them. Indeed, the court managed
33. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
34. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
35. Lorenz, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 467, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
36.Id.
37. Id. at 469, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
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to avoid any mention of the suggestions made in Biltoft for protecting the uninsured spouse's community property interest in
term insurance. The Biltoft court suggested that courts retain
jurisdiction until the policy owner dies or value the community
interest in the same manner as other intangible community
property rights are valued. Clearly, term insurance is unique.
However, it does not follow that the community interest in the
proceeds of such a policy should not be protected, when it is
clear that the policy will render proceeds at some future point.
B.

CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL

"Foster home" includes care in home of relative for
purpose of parental rights termination action.
1.

In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 662 P.2d 922, 191 Cal. Rptr.
464 (1983). In In re Laura F., the California Supreme Court held
that in a parental rights termination action, "foster home"
within the meaning of Civil Code section 232(a)(7),38 includes
care in the home of a relative. The court also upheld the trial
court's finding that the mother, who contested the action, had
not shown that she could provide an adequate home or maintain
an adequate relationship with the children. 39
Three children were removed from their mother's care after
a series of investigations for neglect. 40 Following dependency
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (Deering 1982 and Supp. 1984). Originally, this section provided for a termination action to be initiated only after a child had been cared
for in a foster home for at least two consecutive years. An amendment to section
232(a)(7) reduced the requisite foster home period to one year. In addition, section
232(a)(7) requires that it be shown by clear and convincing evidence that return of the
child to the parent would be detrimental to the child and that during the required foster
care period, the parents have failed or are likely to fail in the future to maintain an
adequate parental relationship with the child. Since the Laura F. decision, section
232(a)(7) has been amended. The legislature replaced "foster homes" with "out-of-home
placement." This change represents legislative approval of that portion of Laura F. that
included the home of a relative within the meaning of "foster home." CAL. CIY. CODE §
232(a)(7) (Deering Supp. 1984)(amending CAL. CIY. CODE § 232(a)(7) (1983».
39. The court also upheld the trial court's determination that the mother had been
offered adequate opportunities for rehabilitation, a necessary prerequisite to regaining
custody; that the appropriate standard of proof in section 232 proceedings is clear and
convincing evidence; and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in failing to
appoint separate counsel for the children.
40. In her dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Bird pointed out that the mother at first
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proceedings,41 the oldest son was placed with his paternal aunt
and uncle and his two younger stepsisters were placed in foster
homes with nonrelatives. Three years later, the state initiated
proceedings to terminate parental rights. 42 At this time, the aunt
and uncle were willing to adopt the boy but the two sisters had
no prospects for adoption. The trial court terminated the
mother's custody and control over all three children. On appeal,
the mother argued as to the boy that "foster home" within the
meaning of section 232(a)(7) does not include care in the home
of a relative, and that as to all three children, the evidence did
not support the court's decision to terminate her parental rights.
Civil Code section 232 prescribes the conditions which must
be met in order for a court to terminate parental custody and
contro1. 43 It seeks to provide a mechanism for termination of parental rights where there is a realistic possibility that a child will
be adopted thereafter. In particular, subdivision (a)(7) provides
that a child must be cared for in a foster home for two or more
consecutive years before termination of parental rights may be
sought. 44 The mother argued that the termination proceedings
did not comply with the threshold requirement with regard to
the boy because he had been living with relatives and not in a
foster home during the requisite two year period.
In support of her position, the mother cited In re Antonio
F.,46 a section 232(a)(7) termination action, as "the first [California] case to define 'foster home' as care other than in the home
of a parent or relative."46 The Antonio F. court took its definivoluntarily assented to foster care for her children due to emotional and financial difficulties that she was experiencing. Although she was investigated by the Department of
Social Services pursuant to accusations of neglect, no formal allegations by the Department were ever made in the original removal of the children from the mother's home. In
re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 841·42, 662 P.2d 922, 923-24, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 474-75
(1983).
41. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3OO(a) (Deering Supp. 1984).
42. The proceedings were initiated under CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (Deering 1982
and Supp. 1984).
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (Deering Supp. 1984).
44. This statutory period has been reduced to one year. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7)
(Deering Supp. 1984) (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (1982».
45. 78 Cal. App. 3d 440, 144 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978).
46. Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d at 830, 662 P.2d at 924, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 466 (1983) quoting
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tion from a relevant section of the Welfare and Institutions
Code 47 which excluded children living with relatives from its
definition of "foster home."48 The United States Supreme Court
discredited the Antonio F. definition in Miller v. Youakin. 49 In
Miller, the Court held that it is unreasonable to differentiate between children who are equally neglected and abused because of
the status of their court-appointed substitute parent. IIO The California Legislature subsequently repealed the Welfare and Institutions Code to reflect the ruling of the Court. III Therefore, the
Laura F. court rejected the Antonio F. definition, stating that
not only was it based on an incorrect construction of the Code,
but that it also precluded the immediate adoptability of children
who had been placed with relatives during the statutory two
year period and, as such, was inconsistent with the purpose of
Civil Code section 232.
In addition to requiring a child to have resided in a foster
home for at least two years prior to commencement of a termi~,
nation action, section 232(a)(7) mandates a showing that a parent failed during that two year period, and is likely to fail in the
future, to provide the child with an adequate parental relationship. In In re Carmaleta B.,1I2 the California Supreme Court interpreted this portion of section (a)(7) as requiring courts to balance the child's interest in secure parenting against the joint
interests of both parent and child in preserving the family bond.
The Carma leta B. court held that this balancing test, along with
an evaluation of parental progress during the two year period in
which the children are away, represents an appropriate measure
of future ability to parent successfully.
Having repeated this criterion, the Laura F. court instead
focused on the mother's past record as a parent prior to the two
In re Antonio F., 78 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (1978».
47. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11251 (Deering 1979) (repealed 1980).
48. Section 11251 specifically excluded children living with relatives from its definition of "foster home" because, under a related federal aid program, foster children who
were on the Aid to Families With Dependent Children Program (AFDC) were allowed
greater benefits than non-foster children on AFDC. Therefore, to exclude the home of a
relative from its definition of "foster home" effectively saved the state money. Id.
49. 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
50. Id. at 145.
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11251 (Deering 1979) (repealed 1980).
52. 21 Cal. 3d at 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
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year separation period. Holding that the evidence was sufficient
to support the termination order as to all three children, the
Laura F. court stated that the mother's past record was the only
accurate indication of her ability to be a good parent in the future. This decision does not represent an application of the
Carmaleta B. court's balancing test, nor does it take into consideration any progress the mother might have made during the
two year rehabilitation period. This approach renders the statutory rehabilitation period meaningless. A balancing approach,
along with a focus on future parenting ability, seems to foster
the child's best interest. This is because it provides more opportunity for a parent to show that he or she has in fact improved
his or her ability to provide a nurturing atmosphere for the
child. Whenever family ties can be preserved without threatening the child's well being it is preferable for all concerned.
Three justices dissented from that portion of the majority
opinion which found it appropriate to terminate the mother's
parental rights as to her two daughters. The dissent stated that
such action was contradictory to the legislative purpose in enacting Civil Code section 232 which is "to serve the welfare and
best interest of a child by providing the stability and security of
an adoptive home when those conditions are otherwise missing
from his or her life."1i3 The dissent pointed out that while the
boy had clear and immediate prospects for adoption, the two
girls had no such opportunities. Also, the fact that the girls suffered from physical and developmental disabilities made their
prospects for future adoption very bleak. Therefore, the dissent
found that it was not in the daughters' best interests to sever
the maternal relationship when no better relationship with
which to replace it was in existence and continuing the relationship was not detrimental to the girls' well-being.
In the absence of a showing that the mother had abused,
neglected, or molested her children, it is not clear what past
parenting record the court relied on in determining that the
mother had no future ability to be an adequate parent. The
court's decision seems to indicate that when a child is placed in
53. 33 Cal. 3d at 845, 662 P.2d at 935, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (1983).
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a foster home, this is prima facie evidence of past bad parenting.
In addition, Laura F. represents a total disregard for the
Carmaleta balancing test and seems to focus solely on past parental behavior as evidenced by a need for foster care.

2. Mediator of child custody or visitation disputes may be
cross-examined upon rendering recommendation to court.
McLaughlin v. Superior Ct., 140 Cal. App. 3d 473, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 479 (1st Dist. 1983). In McLaughlin v. Superior Ct., the
court held that a mediator of child custody and visitation disputes in a marriage dissolution proceeding could not render a
recommendation to a court unless a protective order was issued
which guaranteed the parties the right to cross-examine the mediator concerning the recommendation. The court concluded
that a policy which allowed a court to receive a recommendation
from a mediator, but denied the parties the right to cross-examine the mediator, was a denial of due process and therefore
unconstitutional.
The couple in McLaughlin married in 1969 and agreed to
dissolve their marriage in 1982. When a dispute arose regarding
the custody of the parties' children, the dispute was referred for
mediation, pursuant to California Civil Code section 4607(a).54
The husband moved for a protective order. He contended that
the mediation should proceed, but requested that if no agreement was reached, the mediator should be prohibited from making a recommendation to the court unless the husband was guaranteed the right to cross-examine the mediator. The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that the protective order requested would violate a policy adopted by the court pursuant to
Civil Code section 4607(e), which states in relevant part: "The
mediator may, consistent with local court rules, render a recommendation to the court as to the custody or visitation of the.
children. "66
The trial court had adopted a local policy which required
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (Deering Supp. 1984). Section 4607(a) states "[w)here
it appears ... [that) ... the custody or visitation of ... children ... [is) contested
... the matter shall be set for mediation . . . ."
.
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(e) (Deering Supp. 1984).
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that a mediator make a recommendation to the court if the parties fail to agree on issues of child custody or visitation. The policy also required that the mediator not state his or her reasons
for the recommendation. In accordance with its own policy, the
trial court denied the parties the right to cross-examine the mediator on the ground that the reasons had not even been disclosed to the court. According to the trial court, these requirements are consistent with Civil Code section 4607(c) which
states that the mediatjon proceedings "shall be confidential."116
The court of appeal recognized that section 4607(e) does not
require or authorize cross-examination of the mediator by the
parties. However, the court concluded that a policy which permits a court to receive a significant recommendation on contested issues but denies the parties the right to cross-examine
cannot constitutionally be upheld. In coming to this conclusion,
the court of appeal cited Fewel v. Fewel,1I7 where the court held
it reversible error if an investigator did not appear like any other
witness and testify subject to the rules of evidence and the right
of cross-examination. The court of appeal also relied on Long v.
Long,1I8 a case with facts similar to those in McLaughlin, which
cited Fewel as authority for the proposition that it is a denial of
due process to deny a litigant the right to cross-examine a witness who testifies against him or her.
The court in McLaughlin found these holdings applicable
and therefore construed the permissive language of Civil Code
section 4607(e) in a manner consistent with the due process requirements discussed in Fewel and Long. The court held that a
mediator may not make a recommendation to a court in the absence of a protective order guaranteeing the right to cross-examine the mediator, unless the right has been waived.
By upholding the right to cross-examine the mediator, the
decision is constitutionally sound because it guarantees the parties due process in courts which choose to receive recommenda56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(c) (Deering Supp. 1984).
57. 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943).
58. 251. Cal. App. 2d 732, 736, 59 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1967).
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tions from mediators.
However, if cross-examination of a mediator is mandated
under due process, it follows that a mediator cannot make a recommendation to a court without in effect agreeing to violate the
confidentiality requirement of Civil Code section 4607(c). A mediation proceeding can only work when both parties are assured
that the mediator will not later turn against them. If 11 mediator
wishes to preserve the confidentiality of the mediation proceedings, helshe must refuse to make a recommendation to the court.
This may result in a decision which is not in the child's best
interest. The mediator, a skilled professional, is caught in a
double bind because helshe can no longer recommend what hel
she feels is best for the child without violating the trust and integrity that is the basis of the mediation proceeding.

3. Non-custodial parent may expose children to own religious practices absent clear evidence of harm to children.
In re Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1st
Dist. 1983). In In re Mentry, the court of appeal reversed a trial
court ruling enjoining a non-custodial parent from exposing his
children to his religious practices during their visits with him.
The court ruled that the injunction could not be upheld absent a
clear affirmative showing of harm or likelihood of harm to the
children.
The mother and custodial parent sought to enjoin the noncustodial father from exposing their children to any religious
views not sanctioned by the mother. Although both parents had
been of the same faith during the marriage, the mother had
since changed her religious views. The mother contended that
exposing the children to two conflicting religious doctrines would
confuse them and ultimately harm them. The trial court agreed,
granted the restraining order, and the father appealed.
The father based his argument on the fact that there was no
harm to the children. He cited In re Murga 69 in which a divorced mother asserted that "as the custodial parent, she [had]
59. 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1980).
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an absolute right to direct the child's religious upbringing."60
The Murga court, however, held that "a court will not enjoin the
non-custodial parent from discussing religion with the child or
involving the child in his or her religious activities in the absence of a showing that the child will be thereby harmed."61
However, the Murga court, deciding the case on its facts, failed
to state a test for when such a showing of harm has been made.
Quoting the Massachusetts case Felton u. Felton,62 the
Mentry court stated, "harm to the child from conflicting religious instructions or practices ... should not be simply assumed or surmised; it must be demonstrated in detail."63 In
Mentry, the evidence of harm consisted of testimony by the
mother that one child was having social adjustment problems,
and testimony by a court conciliator predicting future harm to
the children. Rejecting the evidence as "manifestly insufficient,"
the court pointed out that the mother had failed to establish a
correlation between the children's social adjustment problems
and the father's religious practices. The court characterized the
conciliator's testimony as "speculative" in light of the fact that
he had never interviewed the children.
The Mentry court, while reaffirming the Murga rule, did not
articulate any guidelines for when a showing of likelihood of
harm has been made. While it is clear that a showing of actual
harm will satisfy the rule, it is not so clear how close to actual
harm one must come before the court will be inclined to intervene. It seems that the court requires a showing of likelihood of
harm that approaches that end of the spectrum closest to actual
harm before it is likely to intrude into the privacy of the
family.64
[d. at 504, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
[d. at 505, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
418 N.E. 2d 606 (1981).
142 Cal. App. 3d at 265, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (1983).
The Mentry court articulated policy considerations that it finds implicit in the
Murga rule. One consideration is a judicial disinclination to intervene in the family home
absent compelling reasons. The court also favors an approach that seeks to preserve parental autonomy and family harmony. The Mentry court stated that these policies are to
be particularly stressed in litigation surrounding marital dissolution. The reason for this
emphasis is a desire to maintain whatever family ties are left after the breakdown of the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT

1. Failure of one spouse to disclose existence of community asset to other spouse is extrinsic fraud for purpose of setting aside final divorce decree.

In re Marriage of Modnick, 33 Cal.3d 897, 663 P.2d 187, 191
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1983). In In re Marriage of Modnick, the California Supreme Court held that the failure of one spouse to disclose the existence of a community asset to the other constitutes
extrinsic fraud. Because such fraudulent conduct deprived the
complaining spouse of the full opportunity to present her case,
the court found that she was entitled to equitable relief and set
aside the property and spousal support provisions of a final divorce decree. 61i

The couple obtained an interlocutory judgment of marital
dissolution which awarded the wife spousal support and divided
community assets. Thereafter, it was revealed that the husband
had concealed funds belonging to the community.66 The husband agreed to resolve the dispute with the wife over the newly
exposed assets privately. He then requested and obtained a final
judgment which bound the parties to the interlocutory provisions. Relying on their agreement, the wife attempted to negotiate a fair settlement with the husband. Failing in her attempt,
the wife moved to have the interlocutory and final decrees set
aside alleging fraud. The trial court denied her motion and she
appealed.
In Orlando v. Orlando,67 during property settlement proceedings, a husband not only failed to disclose the existence of
community assets, but also took deliberate steps to conceal
family unit as a single entity.
65. The court also held that the wife's claim was not barred by laches because she
had been reasonably diligent in seeking relief and her delay resulted in little, if any,
prejudice to the husband. In addition, the court found that the wife had failed to establish that she and her husband had reconciled during the interlocutory period.
66. The concealment was exposed during an investigation into the husband's
finances by the Internal Revenue Service. The investigation revealed unreported savings
accounts, some of which contained monies earned by the husband during the marriage.
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the husband, in an effort to conceal the accounts, had transferred ownership of them to two relatives.
67. 243 Cal. App. 2d 248, 52 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1966).
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them. The court allowed the final judgment of divorce to be reopened stating: "[a] party may attack a judgment on the ground
of extrinsic fraud when the conduct of the other party has deprived him of an opportunity to present his claim or defense or
to obtain a fair adversary hearing."68
In Kulchar v. Kulchar,69 the supreme court reaffirmed the
position taken by the Orlando court, gave examples of situations
which constitute extrinsic fraud, and distinguished them from
those situations which constitute intrinsic fraud. Where there
has been a false promise of a compromise or where one party has
been kept in ignorance of the acts of the other, such circumstances give rise to a claim of extrinsic fraud, and entitle the
wronged party to a new and fair hearing. 70 However, relief is denied where the fraud is intrinsic; that is, where a party could
have and should have guarded against fraud at the prior hearing.71 In cases of extrinsic fraud, the duty of full disclosure arises
out of the fiduciary relationship which exists between husband
and wife.72 The Modnick court indicated that fiduciary responsibilities inherent in the spousal relationship are ongoing and terminate only when the court has divided the community property
and the marriage is dissolved.
In Modnick, the husband violated his fiduciary duty to the
wife. He did so by failing to disclose and deliberately attempting
to hide community assets from her. The wife had no knowledge
of, nor did she have reason to have knowledge of, the hidden
assets. Therefore, the Modnick court held such actions by the
husband to be extrinsic fraud, the presence of which prevented
the wife from receiving her equitable share of the community
assets and a fair assessment of her spousal support rights. Thus,
the court upheld the wife's motion to vacate the interlocutory
and final judgment of dissolution. In so doing, the Modnick
court followed established California precedent. Moreover, the
court's decision is consistent with the underlying policy of the
68. [d. at 251, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 145.

69.
70.
71.
72.

1 Cal.
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at

3d 467, 462 P.2d 17,82 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1969).
471, 462 P.2d at 19, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
472, 462 P.2d at 20, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
474, 462 P.2d at 21, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
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California community property scheme; that is, to divide equally
all community assets when a marriage is dissolved and to award
spousal support according to need and honest ability to pay.
2. Civil Code section 5127.6 construed to apply only to
custodial parents receiving AFDC and as so construed, held
constitutional.
In re Marriage of Shupe, 139 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 288 (4th Dist. 1983). In In re Marriage of Shupe, the court
addressed the constitutionality of California Civil Code section
5127.6, which creates a presumption that the income of a custodial parent's spouse is available for the support of the custodial
parent's child. The court construed section 5127.6 to apply only
to custodial families who have applied for or are receiving AFDC
benefits and as so construed, upheld its constitutionality.

Upon dissolution, a wife was awarded custody of the parties'
child and her husband was ordered to pay child support. Years
later, she filed an action for increased support payments based
on the increased age of their child and on inflation. In the
meantime, wife had remarried and she and her new husband had
entered into an agreement to hold their earnings as separate
rather than as community property. At the hearing on increasing
his support payments, husband sought to have wife's new husband's income records entered into evidence. She objected on
the ground that under their agreement, her new husband's income was his separate property and not available for the child's
support. Husband contended that Civil Code section 5127.673
created a presumption that all income which, in absence of a
contract between wife and her husband would be community
property, was available to support the child. The trial court refused to admit the evidence and ordered an increase in support.
Husband appealed.
California Civil Code section 5127.674 reads in part: "the
community property interest of a natural or adoptive parent in
the income of his or her spouse shall be considered unconditionally available for the care and support of any child who resides
73. CAL. CIY. CODE § 5127.6 (Deering Supp. 1984).

74. [d.
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with the child's natural or adoptive parent who is married to
such spouse." That section was enacted as part of the Welfare
Reform Act of 197976 for the purpose of presuming the availability of stepparent income in determining eligibility for AFDC
benefits.76 However, section 5127.6 was not limited to AFDC
families because a federal regulation required that, in order for
it to create a presumption of the availability of stepparent income in AFDC determinations, the section must impose a duty
on all stepparents generally to support their stepchildren. 77
Husband in Shupe contended that section 5127.6 invalidated:wife's contract with her new husband insofar as the contract removed the new husband's income from availability for
supporting the child. Wife contended that such an interpretation violated her right to equal protection of the laws because it
guaranteed the availability of the custodial parent's community
property while Civil Code section 1997s immunizes the community property in the non-custodial parent. Civil Code section 199
provides that under the Civil Code, Title 2, Chapter 1,79 the obligations of parents to support their children may be satisfied
only from the parents' total earnings, assets acquired therefrom,
or separate property. In In re Marriage of Brown,so the court
held that section 199 did not conflict with or supersede Civil
Code sections in other chapters which subjected community
property to liability for child supportS1 and subjected a wife's
75. 1979 Cal. Stat. 4561.
76. SEN. COMM. ON HEALTH AND WELFARE. Staff Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 381
(1979).
77. 45 C.F.R. § 233-90 (1983).
The duty of stepparents to make their income available for the support of
nonadopted stepchildren has been subject to judicial review: CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 has
been held not to accomplish its goal of imposing such a duty on all stepparents. Wood v.
Woods, 133 Cal. App. 3d 954, 184 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1982). However, by federal statute,
states are now mandated to include stepparent income in AFDC eligibility determinations. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(31)(1983).
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 199 (Deering Supp. 1984).
79. Id. "[I)ncluding but not limited to §§ 196 and 206 . . ." (Deering Supp. 1984).
80. In Re Marriage of Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979).
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4807 (Deering 1972). Section 4807 reads: "[t)he community
property, the quasi-community property and the separate property may be subjected to
the support, maintenance, and education of the children in such proportions as the court
deems just."
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interest in the community property of her marriage to liability
for child support.82 Therefore, the court rejected wife's equal
protection argument.
However, the Shupe court held that section 5127.6, as construed by husband violated wife's equal protection in another
way. The court could find no rational basis for distinguishing
between custodial and non-custodial parents generally for purposes of presuming availability of their community property interests. 83 Thus, if construed to apply to all custodial parents, the
statute could not be upheld.
Instead of invalidating the statute, however, the court construed it to apply· only to custodial parents who had applied for
or were receiving AFDC. The court held that, as so construed,
section 5127.6 had a rational relationship with the legitimate
government interest of facilitating the administration of government funds. Under section 5127.6, the state would be saved the
inconvenience and expense of monitoring the incomes of noncustodial families, and could deal only with those families directly receiving the AFDC funds. Thus, the court held that section 5127.6 did not violate equal protection as so construed. The
court upheld the judgment below awarding increased support
payments because the wife was not an AFDC recipient or
applicant.
The court in Shupe, by narrowly construing section 5127.6,
effectively avoided the question whether that section invalidates
a pre-marital agreement between a child's parent and stepparent
to keep their incomes as separate property. That question seems
to be moot, however, in light of the new federal statute84 which
requires inclusion of stepparent income in AFDC determinations. Thus, such an agreement between an AFDC parent and
his or her spouse would presumably be invalid insofar as it lim82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1972). Section 5127.5 reads in pertinent part:
"The wife's interest in the community property, including the earnings of her husband,
is liable for the support of her children. . . ."
83. The court relied on Civil Code section 196, CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering 1984),
which imposes equal responsibility on each parent for supporting their child, and Civil
Code section 246, CAL. CIV. CODE § 246 (Deering Supp. 1984), which it held to require
consideration of a parent's community property interest in his or her spouse's income in
determining child support obligations.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(31)(1983).
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ited availability of the stepparent's income to support the child.
D.

HEALTH AND WELFARE

Probate court lacks jurisdiction to order sterilization of
conservatee.
1.

Conservatorship of Valerie N., 152 Cal. App. 3d 224, 199
Cal. Rptr. 478 (1st Dist. 1983). In Conservatorship of Valerie N.,
the court of appeal followed Guardianship of K emp8r. and
Guardianship of Tulley86 and held that a probate court lacks
both statutory authorization and equity jurisdiction to order
sterilization of any person who is under probate conservatorship.
The court also held constitutional Probate Code section
2356(d),87 effective January 1, 1981, which prohibits sterilization
of conservatees under probate jurisdiction.
The natural mother and stepfather of a severely retarded 25
year old woman petitioned the superior court, sitting in probate,
for appointment as her conservators and for authorization to
have her sterilized. The probate court granted the petitioner's
appointment as co-conservators of their daughter's person but
denied their application for authority to have her sterilized. The
court relied upon Probate Code section 2356(d) in its order denying petitioners' application although that statute was not yet
effective. Petitioners appealed, challenging the constitutionality
of the statute.
Probate Code section 2356(d) provides that "[n]o ward or
conservatee may be sterilized under the provisions of this division. "88 This statute was not operative at any time during the
probate court proceedings nor at the time of the order denying
the petitioners' application. Therefore, the constitutional issues
raised on appeal were moot. 89 The court of appeal affirmed the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (Deering 1981).
[d.
However, the court discussed the constitutional issues despite their mootness in
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probate court's order on the basis of Kemp and Tulley.
Both Kemp and Tulley presented issues identical to that in
the present case. The Kemp court noted that a probate court
has exclusive jurisdiction in guardianship proceedings, and once
a guardian is appointed, the court maintains jurisdiction over
the guardian and the administration of the ward's affairs. The
court pointed out that California superior courts exercise probate jurisdiction under constitutional authorization, but that a
probate court's powers and procedures are limited and defined
by statute. The Kemp court found no statute which conferred
upon the probate court the authority to order involuntary sterilization on conservatees under its administration, nor was there
any case law in California to support that extension of its
authority.
In Tulley, the guardian of a mentally incompetent ward argued on appeal that the superior court proceeded as a court of
general jurisdiction and therefore possessed "inherent and unfettered equity power to serve and promote the interest and welfare of the incompetent" including authorizing sterilization
"which was manifestly in the best interest of the ward. "90 The
court rejected this argument on the basis of Kemp and further
reasoned that sterilization "irreversibly denies a human being
the fundamental right to bear and beget a child. "91 Accordingly,
the court followed established precedent in holding that power
to grant such an extreme remedy may not be inferred from general principles of equity jurisdiction derived at common law, but
must come from specific legislative authorization. 92
The court in Valerie N. followed Kemp and Tulley and rejected the petitioner's contentions that probate courts have jurisdiction to order an involuntary sterilization. The court also
reached the constitutionality of Probate Code section 2356(d)
even though that issue was moot in the present case. The court
noted that it was appropriate to "resolve a moot point if it inthe instant case.
90. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 704, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
91. 1d. at 701, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
92. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1977) rev'd on other
grounds, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671, 674 (S.D. Ohio
1971).
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volves 'an issue of continuing public interest that is likely to recur in other cases' " and when such resolution would be "likely
to affect the future rights of the parties before [the court]."93
Petitioners' appeal challenged the statute's constitutionality
on three grounds: 1) the statute denies a conservatee's right to
privacy; 2) the statute denies due process of law; and 3) the statute denies equal protection of the laws. The parents argued that
Probate Code section 2356(d) denied their mentally incompetent
daughter the fundamental right to choose whether or not to bear
a child, which is a right of privacy guaranteed under the United
States and California Constitutions, and protected by due process of law. Only a compelling state interest may limit the exercise of that right.
The court rejected both the right to privacy and due process
arguments on the same grounds. It reasoned that a competent
person's right to choose voluntary sterilization could not be
equated with the compelled sterilization of a mentally incompetent person. The court found that the state has a compelling interest in protecting mentally incompetent persons from the
abuses of forced sterilization. The parent's inconvenience in caring for their child and their fears of an undesirable pregnancy
were inadequate justification for such an extreme and irreversible remedy. Thus, the court found that the statute was necessary to the permissible legislative goal of protecting an incompetent person's right to procreate.
The court also rejected petitioners' equal protection argument. The petitioners argued that the statute unreasonably deprives incompetent persons of the right to choose sterilization on
the same terms afforded to competent persons. The court found
that the statute's differentiation between competent and incompetent persons was not an unreasonable classification. The statute distinguishes between these two groups on the basis of
whether the person knowingly chooses sterilization with full understanding of the finality of its consequences. The respondent
93. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 674, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 287. The court did not explain how
these requirementa were met in this case.
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in this case was afflicted with Down's Syndrome and had an IQ
of 30. The court found that the respondent was not capable of
knowing and voluntary consent to a sterilization procedure, and
the statute prohibits anyone from exercising that consent for
her. Because the statute protects the fundamental right of an
incompetent person to bear children, the court held that it withstands strict scrutiny and does not violate equal protection.
In a lengthy dissent, Associate· Justice Sims disagreed with
the majority's conclusions both as to the court's jurisdiction to
authorize sterilization and as to the constitutionality of section
3256(d). The dissent cited Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers,94 which struck down Budget Act provisions
which limited Medi-Cal funding for abortions. The Myers Court
stated, "[w]hen the state finances the costs of childbirth, but not
the termination of pregnancy, it realistically forces an indigent
pregnant woman to choose childbirth, even though she has the
constitutional right to refuse to do SO."91\ Analogizing to Myers,
the dissent reasoned that the majority's opinion denied the "incompetent a forum in which to determine whether [her] mental
and physical health and best interests [would] be served by sterilization. . . "96 thus forcing her into a choice either to withdraw
from association with men or bear the risk of pregnancy.97 Essentially, the dissent concluded that the court could not avoid
making a choice for the incompetent person, and that the result
of the majority's approach was to make an automatic choice in
favor of bearing children.
Instead of attempting to protect her right not to have such
a choice made for her, the dissent would hold that an incompetent woman has a constitutional right "to have 'freedom of
choice' exercised on her ... behalf through substituted judg94. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
95. Id. at 285, 625 P.2d at 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
96. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 241, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
97. The dissent also relied on authority from other jurisdictions which equates the
right to sterilization with the right to abortion. See, In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo.
1981); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (Conn. 1978). In addition, it relied on In re
Brady, 426 A.2d 467, 473-75 (N.J. 1981), which held that: "The right to choose among
procreation, sterilization and other methods of contraception is an important privacy
right of all individuals. . . . Where an incompetent person lacks the mental capacity to
make that choice, a court should ensure the exercise of that right on behalf of the incompetent in a manner that reflects his or her best interests." 426 A.2d at 475.
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ment of a court of record predicated upon the best interests of
[her] mental and physical health . . . . "98 The dissent would,
however, grant sterilization authorization only after both a full
judicial hearing with notice to relatives and interested parties,
and a comprehensive medical, psychological, and social evaluation of the incompetent person. Further, it would only authorize
sterilization where the following facts were established by clear
and convincing evidence: 1) that the conservatee was legally incompetent to make the sterilization decision herself; 2) that she
had not expressly objected to the operation; 3) that she was incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings; 4) that
she was incapable of understanding the nature of the sexual
function, reproduction, and sterilization; 5) that her incapacity
is likely to be permanent; 6) that she is capable of reproduction;
7) that she is permanently incapable of parenting a child, even
with reasonable assistance; 8) that the avoidance of pregnancy or
procreation is necessary for her mental or physical health and
well being; 9) that less intensive and permanent contraceptive
methods are unworkable, inapplicable, or contraindicated; 10)
that the proposed operation is the least restrictive alternative;
and 11) that the operation will not be harmful.
In keeping with its approach to the jurisdictional question,
the dissent would also hold Probate Code section 2356(d) unconstitutional insofar as it denies "an unreasoning mentally retarded incompetent the right to have a substituted choice made
on her behalf.
"99
Formerly, Welfare and Institutions Code section 7254100
permitted forced sterilization upon persons institutionalized in
state hospitals under carefully prescribed statutory limitations.
The California legislature repealed this statute simultaneously
with enacting Probate Code section 2356(d).101 These two ac98. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 245, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
99. Id. at 254, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99.
100. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7254 (Deering 1979), repealed by Act of Sept. 18,
.
1979, ch. 730, § 156.5, 1979 Cal. Stat. 2540.
101. Stats. 1979, ch. 726, § 3.Q1 codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d). The Law
Revision Commission's commentary to that statute notes that section 2356(d) is consistent with the holdings in Kemp and Tulley. 15 CALIF. L. REV. COM. REP. 451, 700, (1980).
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tions by the legislature demonstrate the state's recognition of
the potential abuses of involuntary sterilization, even when the
procedure is statutorily controlled, and indicate the legislature's
unwillingness to sanction and participate in the forced sterilization of mentally retarded people. The strong opinion and dissent
in Valerie N. accentuate the ethical dilemmas which arise when
society attempts to protect the fundamental rights of people it
has determined are unable to exercise these rights for
themselves.

E.

NON-MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS

Implied contract between unmarried partners
forceable despite subsequent marriage.
1.

LS

en-

Watkins v. Watkins, 143 Cal. App. 3d 651, 192 Cal. Rptr. 54
(3rd Dist. 1983). The court of appeal in Watkins v. Watkins
held that an implied contract between unmarried partners is enforceable despite their subsequent marriage to each other. In addition, the court held that the rule prohibiting a married couple
from contracting with respect to domestic services is inapplicable to contracts entered into while the parties are in a
nonmarital relationship.
A man and a woman lived together for six years in a nonmarital relationship, during which the woman was the homemaker. Thereafter, the parties married. One year later the man
petitioned for a marital dissolution and the woman filed a separate action for breach of implied contract. The trial court upheld
the woman's cause of action and awarded her damages. On appeal, the man maintained that as a matter of law, the woman
lost her right to enforce the contract when they entered into a
legal marriage.
In Marvin v. Marvin,102 the California Supreme Court upheld a non-marital partner's cause of action for breach of implied contract. It held that "[i]n the absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to
determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied con102. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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tract. . . between the parties. "103 Two policy considerations justified the result in Marvin: 1) a desire to fulfill the reasonable
expectations of the parties to a non-marital relationship;104 and
2) a desire to achieve an equitable distribution of the property
acquired between the parties during the relationship. 1011
To extinguish automatically the wife's contract rights upon
marriage, reasoned the Watkins court, would be incompatible
with the goals of Marvin. The Watkins court, following Marvin,
stated that homemaker services are not without value; therefore,
to deprive the woman of her right to assert her claim would nullify her contribution to the partnership. 1OS Therefore, the Watkins court found an implied contract existed between the parties
during their six year relationship preceding marriage. In addition, those rights were determined to be earned rights and as
such were not extinguishable despite a subsequent marriage.
The husband argued that postmarital enforcement of the
contract was in derogation of the marital relationship. The Watkins court rejected his contention and stated that failing to preserve such rights would in fact discourage marriage because
those who acquire them will fear forfeiture if they marry.
The court then discussed and distinguished two cases which
held certain contracts between married people to be invalid. In
Estate of Sonnickson,107 a man and a woman entered into a
written contract while unmarried and not in contemplation of
marriage. Under the terms of the agreement, the woman was to
serve as companion to and homemaker for the man for the rest
of his life in return for a portion of his real and personal property when he died. In addition, the woman agreed to give up her
profession in order to devote herself full time to her commit103. [d. at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
104. [d. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 83l.
105. [d. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.

106. The Watkins court pointed out that during the six years that the unmarried
parties lived together, the woman acted as homemaker, cook, nurse, and confidant to the
man. In addition, she assisted with the rearing of his children.
107. 23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 73 P.2d 643, (1937).
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ment under the contract. lOS The couple later married. Upon the
man's death, the woman sought to enforce the written contract.
The Sonnicksen court refused to uphold the premarital contract
and stated that "[w]hen the parties subsequently entered into a
contract of marriage and became husband and wife, one of the
implied terms of the contract of marriage was that [she] would
perform without compensation the services covered by [the]
written agreement."109
In Brooks v. Brooks,l1O in consideration for marriage and
support during the marriage, a woman agreed to provide nursing
and housekeeping services for a man. Brooks held the contract
to be void stating the rule "that a married woman cannot contract with her husband with respect to domestic services which
are incidental to her marital status, since such contracts are
against public policy."111
The Watkins court stated that "[i]n both Sonnicksen and
Brooks, the applicable contracts explicitly provided that the woman necessarily had to provide services during the marriage in
order to receive the consideration contemplated by the contracts."112 The Watkins court distinguished Sonnicksen and
Brooks by holding that the contract in the instant case was unrelated to the marital relationship. The woman sought only to
enforce rights she had gained prior to the marriage. She made
no contract claim for domestic services rendered for any period
of time inclusive of the marriage. Therefore, the court held that
no public policy was compromised and upheld the woman's right
to enforce the contract.
The Watkins court upheld the right to imply a contract between a man and a woman who live together unmarried, as established in Marvin. In addition, the validity of such a contraCt
survives marriage. The Watkins holding is consistent with pub108. Prior to and at the time the parties entered into the contract, the woman had
been engaging in professional nursing work. [d. at 476, 73 P.2d at 644.
109. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d at 479, 73 P.2d at 645.
110. 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 119 P.2d 970 (1941).
111. [d. at 350, 119 P.2d at 972.
112. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 56. In Sonnicksen, although the
contract was premarital, the wife would receive consideration under the contract only
after providing care and companionship for the remainder of the husband's life, a period
necessarily including any marriage. 23 Cal. App. 2d at 476, 73 P.2d at 644.
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lic policies favoring marriage and the equitable distribution of
property in that it prevents those who would breach Marvin
contracts by abusing the privilege of marriage from doing so.

III. TORT LAW
A.

WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTIONS

1. Privacy rights of institutionalized woman bar her recovery for failure to supervise sexual activity; cause of action
for failure to provide birth control and pre-natal care upheld.

Foy v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App. 3d 1, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1st
Dist. 1983). In Foy v. Greenblott, the court of appeal allowed an
institutionalized, incompetent woman to sue medical care providers for the wrongful birth of her child. However, although the
court permitted plaintiff to pursue her cause of action, it severely curtailed her chances of recovery by limiting the scope of
the duty owed to her by her doctors and by charging her with a
heavy burden of proof. The court imposed these constraints out
of a concern for plaintiff's constitutional and statutory rights of
privacy and reproductive freedom.lI3
Plaintiff Virgie Foy, a conservatee, was a patient in a private, locked, mental facility. Although she had a history of "irresponsible sexual behavior,"114 her contact with males was unsupervised and she was given no contraceptive counseling,
113. The court also allowed her action for failure to provide prenatal care. However,
the court denied her son's cause of action for "wrongful life" in accordance with prior
California decisions which preclude recovery to an unimpaired child. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). The action by mother and son for "deprivation of
a normal parent-child relationship" was denied on the grounds that loss of parental/filial
consortium is not actionable, especially where it never existed in the first place. See
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977);
Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977). Finally,
defendant County of Santa Clara, public guardian, was found to be immune under the
California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 854.8(a)(2) (Deering 1982).
114. The opinion fails to define "irresponsible sexual behavior." Thus it is unclear
whether plaintiff did not understand the nature of the activity, was incap~ble of controlling her actions, did not comprehend possible consequences, or simply did not conform
to a societal norm in her behavior.
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medication, or devices. Her pregnancy was not diagnosed until
two weeks before delivery and she received no prenatal care.
The terms of her conservatorship precluded plaintiff from making any medical decisions. Plaintiff sued, inter alia, on a theory
of wrongful birth and the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer. Plaintiff appealed.
Under current California case law, unwanted pregnancy and
birth is actionable if plaintiff can show that the wrongful birth
was the proximate result of medical malpractice. This case is
distinguished from other wrongful birth cases, lUi because due to
her mental condition plaintiff did not and could not actively
seek to prevent or terminate her pregnancy. Plaintiff urged that
the scope of duty owed her by defendants included better supervision of her private activities; contraceptive counseling and
medication; a timely diagnosis of pregnancy; and an opportunity
to abort.
Plaintiff theorized that as an incompetent female she should
under no circumstances have been allowed to bear a child. She
further argued that the scope of defendants' duty to her included the prevention of such an occurrence. The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, has held that a woman has a fundamental right
of privacy in matters of reproductive choice. us Furthermore,
mental patients and conservatees in this state enjoy "the same
legal rights ... guaranteed all other persons . . . . "117 The California Probate Code specifically prohibits sterilization of mentally incompetent persons. U8 Only when a patient's life was in
danger has a California court set aside this prohibition. us Because plaintiff made no claim of medical necessity for sterilization and because reproductive freedom is accorded the highest
constitutional protection, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that
115. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (negligently performed tubal ligation); Sills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1976) (unsuccessful abortion).
116. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1 (Deering Supp. 1984). See also CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5327 (Deering 1979).
118. "No ward or conservatee shall be sterilized under the provisions of this division." CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (Deering 1981). See also supra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
119. Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1982) (hysterectomy of conservatee authorized on a showing that without the procedure she stood
an 80% chance of developing cancer).
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defendants had an absolute duty to prevent the birth of her
child.
Similarly, the court held that defendants were not negligent
in failing to supervise plaintiff's access to males. The degree of
supervision which would have been required to ensure that
plaintiff did not conceive would have countermanded California's express policy that institutionalized persons be cared for in
the least restrictive environment possible and that interference
with patient's privacy and social interaction be kept to the feasible minimum. 12o The court reasoned: (a) that voluntary sexual
activity could not be regarded as "an objective harm which the
patient must be spared";121 and (b) that such potential tort liability would discourage hospitals from giving patients more than
minimal freedom.
The court held that concern for patients' constitutional and
statutory rights did not dictate dismissal of plaintiff's remaining
theories. Defendants' failure to provide her with contraceptives
potentially violated the same right of reproductive choice that
the court sought to protect in dismissing plaintiff's other claims.
Furthermore, defendants' failure timely to diagnose plaintiff's
pregnancy deprived her of both the choice to abort and of necessary prenatal care. 122
However, in order to prevail in her claim, the court held
that plaintiff must prove that had contraceptive methods been
available she would have used them and they would have been
effective. In light of plaintiff's mental condition, it is unlikely
that she could have profited from counseling or used contraceptive methods which would have required her active participation. Other methods, such as IUD or contraceptive pills, medical
risks notwithstanding, would have required consent by her conservator. It is unlikely that plaintiff's conservator would have
been willing to second-guess a patient's reproductive choice.
120. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1(a), (b), (g), § 5358(a), (c) (Deering Supp.
1984).
121. 141 Cal. App. 3d at 11, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
122. The court held that even if plaintiff cannot prevail in her action for wrongful
birth, she may still recover for negligent deprivation of prenatal care.
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Even if plaintiff managed to surmount this difficulty, there
would still remain the burden of proving the effectiveness of her
chosen contraceptive method.
Alternatively, plaintiff must prove that had she been given
the choice to abort, she would have done so. Since plaintiff was
incapable of consent,123 she must prove that her conservator/
guardian would have sought and been able to obtain a court order authorizing the procedure. 124 Because plaintiff's pregnancy
was non-life threatening it is very unlikely that her conservator
would have been able to persuade a court to order an abortion.
If, however, plaintiff were able to meet the burden of proof required by the court she should be able to recover both general
and special damages for wrongful birth.
The court was rightfully solicitous of the possibilities of infringing on mental patients' constitutional and statutory rights.
In protecting plaintiff's rights of privacy, patient autonomy, and
reproductive choice, however, the court may have denied the
possibility of recovery to a plaintiff who suffered a legally cognizable wrong. The court also failed to provide any guidance for
medical care providers as to how best to safeguard the health
and interests of institutionalized women of childbearing age.
B.

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Cause of action for battery and deceit arising out of
misrepresentation of sterility upheld.
1.

Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr.
422 (1st Dist. 1983), (hearing denied) (Sept. 29, 1983). In Barbara A. v. John G., the court addressed the question of whether
or not a woman has a valid cause of action against a man with
whom, because of his representation of sterility, she consents to
have intercourse. The court held that the man's conduct was ac123. According to the terms of her conservatorship, plaintiff lacked the capacity to
consent.
124. The court cites Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 626, 185 Cal.
Rptr. at 516, as an example of the extraordinary showing which would be required to
obtain such an order. Maxon, however, concerned an order for sterilization where the
patient's life was in danger, not therapeutic abortion for an incompetent.
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tionable in tort and that the woman's complaint stated facts sufficient to sustain actions for battery and deceit. Because of a
preexisting attorney-client relationship between the parties, the
woman also claimed that the man had breached his fiduciary
duty toward her, as her attorney, because he did not act in good
faith for her benefit with respect to their personal relationship.
The court refused to hold the man to a professional fiduciary
standard in his personal relationship with the woman as a matter of law. Instead, the court imposed the burden on the woman
to show that the parties had not been dealing as equal adults in
their personal relationship.
Prior to engaging in sexual intercourse, the woman asked
her male partner to use a condom. She told him that she would
not engage in intercourse with him at the risk of pregnancy. In
response to her request, the man stated, "I can't possibly get
anyone pregnant." The woman interpreted ,the man's statement
as a representation of sterility and therefore consented to intercourse. Subsequently, she developed an ectopic pregnancyl2li
which resulted in the loss of a fallopian tube and possible sterility.126 The woman brought an action against the man alleging
battery127 and misrepresentation (deceit).128 In sustaining the
125. Ectopic pregnancy is a general medical term used to refer to any implantation
of a fertilized ovum occurring outside of the uterine cavity. Although the location of an
ectopic pregnancy may vary, its most common site, as in the instant case, is the fallopian
tube. Ectopic pregnancy is a medical emergency which may lead to severe hemorrhage
and death unless diagnosed promptly. "Once the diagnosis is made, operative treatment
is indicated." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY E-8 (C.L. Thomas, M.D., M.P.H.
ed. 12th ed. 4th printing 1973).
126. Although the woman's pleadings alleged that she was sterile, she only claimed
loss of one fallopian tube. Normally, one cannot be considered medically sterile unless
both tubes are either lost or irreparably damaged. The court stated that the discrepancy
was an issue for the trier of fact and did not deprive the woman of her cause of action.
127. In the battery action, the woman contended that although she had consented
to the intentional touching, her consent was vitiated in two ways: first, the resulting
impregnation exceeded the scope of her consent and second, the consent had been fraudulently induced.
128. Civil Code section 1709 sanctions an action for fraudulent deceit, CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1709 (Deering 1971), and Civil Code section 1710 defines deceit. CAL. CIV. CODE §
1710 (Deering 1971). The essential elements of a deceit action are: 1) a false representation made by a defendant who; 2) had knowledge or belief that the representation was
false or had no reasonable basis for believing it to be true; and 3) the false representation
was made with the intent to induce the plaintiff to alter his or her position in reliance on
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man's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court held
that the woman's complaint failed to state a cause of action. The
woman appealed.
On appeal, the man argued that the woman's allegations
were tantamount to an action for seduction. Civil Code section
43.5 129 prohibits a cause of action for seduction in California.
Davis v. Stroud 130 involved a seduction action that was filed a
few days before the enactment of section 43.5. In Davis, the
court stated, "[s]eduction imports the idea of illicit intercourse
accomplished by the use of arts, persuasions,. or wiles to overcome the resistance of a female who is not disposed of her own
volition to step aside from the paths of virtue."131 Nothing in the
Barbara A. complaint alleged inducement to intercourse against
the woman's free will. In fact, she admitted that her consent was
freely given. The essence of her complaint was that her consent
was induced by a false representation, not because of any undue
influence which prohibited her from exercising free will. The
court held that the woman's cause of action had no substantive
relationship to an action for seduction and therefore, section
43.5 was inapplicable.
In Stephen K. v. Roni L.,132 a woman allegedly misrepresented to a man that she was taking oral contraceptives. In reliance on her representation, the man engaged in sexual intercourse with her. The woman became pregnant and a child,
unwanted by the man, was born. The woman brought a paternity action against the man. Admitting paternity, the man filed
a cross complaint alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and negligence. 133
The court in Stephen K. held that the man did not state a
cause of action. It held that "as a matter of public policy the
practice of birth control, if any, engaged in by two partners in a
the misrepresentation; 4) the plaintiff justifiably relief upon the representation; and 5)
suffered damage as a result of his or her reliance.
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (Deering 1971).
130. 52 Cal. App. 2d 308, 126 P.2d 409 (1942) (cited in P.2d as Briggs v. Stroud).
131. [d. at 317, 126 P.2d at 414.
132. 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980).
133. He further alleged that as a proximate result of the woman's tortious conduct,
he had suffered emotional distress secondary to a legal obligation to support an unwanted child. [d. at 642, Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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consensual sexual relationship is best left to the individuals involved, free from any government interference."134 Although the
man in that case had allegedly been intentionally deceived, the
Stephen K. court held that the privacy interests involved outweighed his interest in being compensated for the intentional
wrong.
The Barbara A. court pointed out that although a fundamental right to privacy does exist in matters relating to marriage, family, and sex, the right is not absolute. The court stated
that there are instances in which the individual's privacy interests are outweighed by compelling government concerns. Particularly, the court pointed out that in cases of spousal rape and
paternity disputes, the parties cannot insulate themselves from
judicial inquiry into their private sexual affairs. Therefore, the
Barbara A. court held that the man could not preclude the woman's cause of action by asserting a privacy interest because his
privacy interest was substantially outweighed by the policy in
favor of compensating individuals for injuries sustained as a result of intentional tortious conduct.
Because of its approach to the privacy issue, the Barbara A.
decision appears to be in direct conflict with that in Stephen K.
However, the Barbara A. court agreed with the outcome in Stephen K. but on different grounds. The court predicated its approval of Stephen K. on the promotion of the child's best interest, rather than on privacy grounds, because Stephen K. was, in
essence, a wrongful birth action against a parent based on deceit. 1311 The Barbara A. court reasoned that to allow a natural
parent to recover for the "wrongful birth" of his or her own
child would both decrease the availability of funds for the support of the child and possibly damage the child emotionally!36
134. [d. at 645, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
135. However, both Barbara A. and Stephen K. distinguished the actionable
"wrongful birth" cases. The court in Barbara A. stated that "[t]he actions have uni·
formly been instituted by parents against health professionals for negligence causing the
birth of a child or the birth of an impaired child." Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 379
n.S, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 429; see also Stephen K., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 643-44, 164 Cal. Rptr.
at 619-20 for a similar analysis.
136. The court reasoned that such a cause of action would be strong evidence of
parental rejection.
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The court held that this result would be contrary to public policy and to a statutory duty imposed on both parents to support
their child. 1s7 Because the damages in Barbara A. stemmed from
personal physical injury to the woman, rather than from the
birth of a child, the court found that the policy considerations
involved in Stephen K. were not applicable, and that a cause of
action was stated.
The Barbara A. court seems to be saying that when a child
is involved, an intra parental tort claim for battery or deceit will
be barred as against public policy, notwithstanding the underlying merits of the cause of action. The Stephen K. court was confronted with a factual situation which afforded ample opportunity for the court to articulate clearly a rule barring
intraparental tort claims where the damages alleged flow from
the existence of an unwanted child. Yet, the Stephen K. court
chose instead to focus on the privacy issue.
The Barbara A. court has exposed the Stephen K. court's
reluctance to confront the real issue before it. It has done so by
stating that privacy rights are not absolute and must bow when
stronger policy interests are compromised. It seems that where a
child's best interest is at stake, tort claims between the parents
will not be allowed. However, where there is no child to protect,
there is no policy which justifies the denial of a valid tort action.
IV.

A.

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Use of liquor license revocation to enforce Unruh Civil
Rights Act upheld.
1.

Easebe Enterprises, Inc. v. Rice, 141 Cal. App. 3d 981, 190
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1983). In Easebe Enterprises, Inc. v. Rice, the
court of appeal upheld the revocation of a liquor license issued
to a business enterprise practicing gender-based discrimination
against male patrons. The court, in addition to finding that suffi137. Civil Code section 196a states in relevant part: "[tlhe father as well as the
mother of a child must give him support and education suitable to his circumstances."
CAL. CIV. CODE 196a (Deering Supp. 1984).
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cient evidence existed for the action, rejected arguments that
the discrimination was appropriate or justified under the circumstances. The decision reinforces a statutory scheme mandating use of California's administrative bodies to eliminate discrimination in business establishments.
Responding to complaints that Chippendale's, a nightclub
featuring "male exotic dancers," refused to admit men during
performances, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control investigated, confirmed the allegations, and revoked the
club's liquor license. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Board upheld the revocation. 138 The court initially denied review
of the Board's decision but the California Supreme Court, after
granting a hearing, retransferred the case to it.
The Unruh Civil Rights Actl39 guarantees equal access to
business establishments for all persons, regardless of sex, race,
color, religion, ancestry, or national origin. Long considered a
powerful statement of public policy, the Act has frequently been
the basis for judicial elimination of various forms of discrimination.140 The California Legislature enacted Business and Professions Code section 125.6 141 as another means of eliminating discrimination. Any person. accepting a license under the Business
smd Professions Code is subject to disciplinary action under section 125.6 for discrimination based on race, coior, sex, reiigion,
ancestry, physical handicap, marital status, or national origin.
In reviewing the Department's decision, the Easebe court's
inquiry was limited to the question of whether there was substantial evidence to support the revocation.142 After exammmg
138. Easebee [sic] Enterprises, Inc., No. AB-4958, slip op. (1982).
139. CAL. CIY. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1984).
140. See, e.g., Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496 (1982) (landlord's "no children" policy violated Unruh Act); In re Cox, 3 Cal.
3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970) (kinds of discrimination specified in Act
serve only as illustrative, rather than restrictive, indicia of the bases of discrimination
condemned); Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982)
(landlords may not refuse to rent to homosexuals because of sexual preference).
141. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 125.6 (Deering Supp. 1983).
142. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23090.2 (Deering Supp. 1983). See also Kirby v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 433, 436, 498 P.2d 1105, 1107, 102 Cal.
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the testimony given at the administrative hearings, it found the
evidence adequate to sustain a finding of sex discrimination.
The court then reviewed the sources of the Department's
authority to revoke a liquor license. It found that the California
constitution granted to the Department unique power to administer licenses in accord with the state's public policy.143 It determined that the public policy to be enforced was the Unruh Act's
ban on gender-based discrimination.
The court also held the revocation action to be a valid exercise of the Department's powers under provisions of the Business and Professions Code. The Department had issued Chippendale's a liquor license as a "public premises" under section
23039 of the Business and Professions Code. I44 The court held
that Chippendale's violated section 125.6 by discriminating in
performing its licensed activity and was subject to disciplinary
action.
The importance of judicial support for a license revocation
made under section 125.6 cannot be underestimated. The court
could have based its support for the revocation action solely
upon the special powers of the Department as found in the state
constitution, but such a decision would have no significance for
other departments with licensing powers granted in the Business
and Professions Code. While damages and injunctive relief are
available through the courts for violations of the Unruh Act
under Civil Code section 52,145 this decision demonstrates judicial approval of an alternative method of stopping sex discrimination through the economic power of licensing bodies.
Chippendale's offered three arguments in support of its discriminatory practices. It proposed that the practice was necesRptr. 857, 859 (1972) (review of decision limited to whether findings are supported by
substantial evidence).
143. "The Department shall have the power, in its discretion, to deny, suspend or
revoke any specific alcoholic beverage license if it shall determine for good cause that the
granting or continuance of such license would be contrary to public welfare . . . ." CAL.
CONST. art. 20, § 22.
144. "[PJremises maintained and operated for the selling and serving of alcoholic
beverages to the public for consumption on the premises . . . ." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 23039 (Deering Supp. 1964).
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (Deering Supp. 1984).
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sary to protect the rights of its male dancers to engage in a constitutionally protected form of communication. The court held
that withdrawing the privilege of selling alcoholic beverages did
not preclude the continuation of the "communication" and so
did not violate the First Amendment.
Chippendale's also argued that the discriminatory policy
was necessary for its economic survival since women customers
would not attend performances if men were admitted. The court
rejected this second argument, holding that the public policy of
nondiscrimination must be enforced despite the possible detrimental effect to the business enterprise involved. 146
Finally, the court examined Chippendale's claim that its
practices benefited women who had, as a group, been victims of
past discrimination. While recognizing that the rationale of benign discrimination had been accepted for certain governmental
practices,147 the court adopted the Department's determination
that public policy was better served by equal access for all persons.148 The court went on to state in dictum, however, that if it
had been the trier of fact it might have found the argument of
benign motivation persuasive. If administrative bodies were capable of such decisions, their powers would be greatly expanded.
Not only could a department find a iicensee guiiiy of discrimination, it could determine the action to be benignly inspired as a
matter of fact and so permissible despite the Unruh Act or sec146. See also Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 740, 640 P.2d 115, 126,
180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 508 (1982) (entrepreneurs cannot pursue a broad status-based exclusionary policy).
147. The court specifically noted: Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,
450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding California law for statutory rape which punishes only
males); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding regulation permitting female naval officers to remain in Navy a longer period before facing mandatory discharge
for want of promotion than male officers); and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding statute granting widows, but not widowers, a property tax exemption).
148. Among the Department's special findings was an unusual explanation of the
balance involved: "In arguendo, on the one hand the determination as to whether the
community is better served by a policy which provides a female audience an uninhibited
environment in which to openly or boisterously express itself; and on the other hand a
policy which provides to all persons, both males and females, unqualified access to public
places. The latter is the fulcrum of an ordered society!" Quoted in Easebee [sic), No. AB4958, slip op. at 4.
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tion 125.6.
In approving the revocation action, the court enforced the
legislative policy that gender-based discrimination is not to be
tolerated in business establishments. The decision is significant
because it supports the disciplinary powers granted administrative bodies to enforce this policy. While the Unruh Act has been
an important resource for combatting discrimination in the
courts, Californians may now find that use of licensing bodies
will prove an equally effective method to eliminate discrimination. Further, the dictum that these bodies may even approve
benign discrimination would, if followed, expand their power to
an unprecedented degree.

B.

AGE DISCRIMINATION

Holding in Marina Point v. Wolfson extended to prevent non-profit homeowners' association from discriminating
against families with children.
1.

O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association, 33 Cal. 3d
790,662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983). In O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association, the Supreme Court extended
the holding in Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson 149 to find that a
restriction in the covenants, conditions and restrictions of a condominium development limiting residency to persons age eighteen and over is prohibited by the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 150 It
held that the non-profit homeowners association set up by the
developer which, in addition to maintenance duties, enforced the
conditions, covenants and restrictions, was a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Act and that such finding was
consistent with the legislature's intent to use the term "business
establishment" in the broadest sense possible.
Plaintiffs, a married couple and owners of a unit in The Village Green, had a child four years after moving into their condominium. The association gave them notice that the presence of
their son violated the age restrictive covenant and that he would
have to vacate the premises. The couple filed suit to have the
149. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1984).
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age restriction declared invalid and to enjoin its enforcement.
The trial court sustained defendant association's demurrer without leave to amend. When plaintiffs appealed, defendants filed
for and were granted an injunction against plaintiffs' continued
residency in the condominium. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Unruh Civil Rights Act states: "All persons within the
jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever."llil Although age discrimination is not specifically prohibited, the court had previously held in In re Cox that
the Act's legislative history indicates that the specifically enumerated forms of discrimination were meant to be "illustrative
rather than exhaustive. "1112
In 1982 this court addressed discrimination against children
in housing in Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson. 11l3 The circumstances in Marina Point differed from those here in one major
respect. Plaintiffs in Marina Point were tenants in the building;
here plaintiffs were owners of a unit in the development. In Marina Point, defendants were landlords of rental apartment.s;
whereas here defendant was the condominium owners association. The court in Marina Point reasoned that blanket exclusion
of a class· of individuals on the basis of a generalized prediction
that the class as a whole is more likely to become a nuisance
than some other class was arbitrary and was prohibited by the
Unruh Act. 1II4 The court found that no compelling interest justified such discrimination.
Since Marina Point was dispositive of the age discrimination issue, the O'Connor court found the determinative issue
here to be whether the Association was a "business establishment" within the meaning of the act. The defendants in
151.
152.
153.
154.

[d.

In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 212, 474 P.2d 992, 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (1970).
30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
Id. at 739, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
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O'Connor contended that it was a private, non-profit organization, whose members were the individual condominium owners,
loosely organized as a maintenance body and as such not a "business establishment" covered by the Act. The O'Connor court
disagreed.
In Burks v. Poppy Construction,165 the court examined the
scope of the language "business establishment of every kind
whatsoever." The court concluded that a real estate developer of
housing tracts operated a business establishment within the
meaning of the Act, and therefore was prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race when selling his homes. The court in
Burks reasoned that the statute's lack of specification of particular kinds of enterprises left "no doubt that the term 'business
establishments' was used in the broadest sense reasonably possible."l66 Furthermore, the Burk court noted that the original version of the bill made specific references to types of businesses
intended to be covered. These original references included private or public groups, organizations, and associations. The court
reasoned that the deletion of specific references in the bill's final
version and the substitution of the phrase "of every kind whatsoever" broadened the scope of the term "business establishments," and therefore is indicative of a legislative intent to include, as formerly specified, private and public groups or
organizations that might reasonably be found to constitute a
business.
The court in O'Connor followed Burk and found that The
Village Green Owner's Association was a business establishment
because its overall function was to "protect and enhance the
project's economic value," and it functioned very much like a
business in performing its multiple duties.
Defendant also contended that it had fewer effective remedies since it could not use the summary procedure of unlawful
detainer available to landlords to remedy nuisances caused by
disruptive or mischievous children. The court found this argument unpersuasive. It reasoned that the association could adopt
deportment regulations and sufficiently rely on its normal proce155. 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962).
156. Id. at 468, 370 P.2d at 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
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dures to enforce them as it would in enforcing other use and
conduct regulations.
The Marina Point court recognized a strong social interest
in prohibiting discrimination against children in housing. The
court stated: "[a] society that sanctions wholesale discrimination
against its children in obtaining housing engages in suspect activity."167 In refusing to sanction the discrimination in the instant case by private, non-profit organizations, the O'Connor
court has correctly interpreted the objective of the Unruh Act l118
which is to prohibit all forms of arbitrary discrimination by
"business establishments engaged in the sale or rental of real
property. "1119
Justice Broussard concurred in the court's opinion but also
made an additional argument for prohibition of any discrimination in housing based on California Civil Code section 53. 160 He
found section 53 to be more to the point since its language specifically prohibits discrimination in the "conveyance, encumbrance, leasing or mortgaging of real property." Section 53 lists
the same prohibited discriminations as section 51 and makes
any such discriminatory use of real property void regardless of
whether or not it is done by a business establishment.
Justice Mosk dissented for two reasons. First, he argued
that including age in the scope of prohibited discriminations was
creating legislation "in an area in which the legislature has deliberately refused to [act]."161 Second, he contended that characterizing the homeowners association as a business was an unreasonable extension of the statute.
The legislature, however, has for good reason not included
age in the enumerated prohibitions. The statute's language is
too broad for it. If age were included, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that children of any age could demand to be
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

30 Cal. 3d at 744, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (Deering Supp. 1984).
58 Op. Att'y Gen. 608 (1975).
CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering Supp. 1984).
33 Cal. 3d at 801, 662 P.2d at 434, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
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served alcohol in saloons and restaurants, or could demand admission to adult theatre houses. Additionally, if homeowners' associations were not construed as "business establishments," they
would hypothetically be allowed to discriminate against future
buyers on whatever basis contained within their conditions, covenants and restrictions, including sex, race or national origin,
and there is no reasonable justification for such an exemption
from the Unruh Act's requirements.
V.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A.

NONMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS

1. Relocation with "nonmarital loved one" is not good
cause for termination of employment under Unemployment Insurance Code.

Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 34
Cal. 3d 1, 663 P.2d 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1983), (rehearing
denied) (June 6, 1983). In Norman v. Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board, the California Supreme Court addressed the
question whether voluntary termination of employment in order
to relocate with a "nonmarital loved one"162 constitutes "good
cause" within the meaning of California Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256. 163 In a four to three decision, the court
held that termination under such circumstances does not fall
within the purview of "good cause" under section 1256 unless
the claimant establishes that marriage is imminent. 164
162. The court uses the term "nonmarital loved one" even though the facts in the
instant case specifically refer to a girlfriend/boyfriend relationship. One may speculate
that the court intentionally chose this term to cover all types of relationships, including
those that have no possibility of becoming marital.
163. Section 1256 provides in pertinent part: "An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he left his most recent work
voluntarily without good cause. . . . " CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (Deering 1971).
164. The court stated that "good cause" is also shown where a claimant establishes
that the move is precipitated by a marriage-related obligation or that actual presence in
the new location is necessary to implement marriage-related plans. 34 Cal. 3d at 9, 663
P.2d at 909, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
In response to the trial court decision in Norman, the California Legislature
amended section 1256. The amendment expressly affords a spouse "good cause" when he
or she voluntarily terminates employment to relocate with his or her spouse. CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (Deering Supp. 1984).
The Norman court also stated that its decision did not violate the claimant's consti-
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A woman quit her employment in order to relocate to another state with her boyfriend,l6& with whom she had been living
for three years. She subsequently filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits with the California Employment
Development Department. The Department determined that no
"good cause" existed for the termination and denied her claim.
The determination was reaffirmed both on administrative appeal
and on appeal to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.
Claimant then brought suit in superior court.166 The trial court
held that "good cause" had been established and awarded benefits. 167 The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and the
Department joined in appealing the trial court decision.
Section 1256 allows a claimant to collect benefits despite the
voluntary nature of employment termination, provided "good
cause" is established. In 1980, new regulations were promulgated
by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. 168 As noted by
the dissent, the regulations in effect create a presumption in
favor of a person about to become married. Specifically, the new
regulations describe circumstances under which "good cause" is
established for a voluntary quit: "Such circumstances are considered 'good cause' if the claimant's obligation is of a real, substantial, and compelling nature . . . and the claimant's reason
for leaving work is due to a legal or moral obligation related to,
inter alia, the existing or prospective marital status of the claimtutional rights of privacy and freedom of association. The court refused to characterize
the nature of claimant's relationship with her boyfriend as one akin to a marital relationship. Therefore, the court determined that no fundamental privacy right had been denied her. Claimant was not denied the right to relocate with her boyfriend. Therefore,
the court found that no violation of the right to associate freely had occurred. The court
stated that the fact that she had been denied benefits because of her actions did not
infringe her right to free association.
165. Claimant testified that she became engaged to be married four months after
terminating her employment and that a marriage date was set for four months after the
date of engagement.
166. Suit was brought in superior court by petition for a writ of mandate. C~. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (Deering 1973).
167. While recognizing that "good cause" is an issue of law as established in Perales
v. Department of Human Resources Dev., 32 Cal. App. 3d 332, 336, 108 Cal. Rptr. 167,
170 (1973), the trial court stated: "[T)he absence of any marital relationship [does) not,
as a matter of law, preclude an award of unemployment compensation benefits." Norman, 34 Cal. 3d at 4, 663 P.2d at 906, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
168. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 1256-1·1256-43 (1980).
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ant. 169 The Norman court, while not bound by the 1980 regulations, relied on them for guidance as to the legislative purpose in
enacting section 1256, particularly its intended construction of
"good cause. "170
The Norman court also considered another administrative
regulation, California Administrative Code section 1256-12,
which expressly states that marriage or imminence of marriage
may constitute "good cause" for the purposes of section 1256.171
Coupling the language of the proposed regulation with that of
section 1256-12, the court deduced that section 1256 should be
interpreted to facilitate the overriding legislative scheme, that is,
a scheme which prefers the establishment and maintenance of
marital relationships. The Norman court concluded that any judicial determination of "good cause" must be consistent with
that policy. Finally, the court pointed out that requiring a showing of marriage or imminence thereof alleviates many of the
proof problems associated with a case by case analysis of the
"good cause" worthiness of any given relationship. Alleviation of
proof problems in order to facilitate administrative convenience
has been recognized as a legitimate government interest. However, that interest must be balanced against the risk of depriving
individuals of important, perhaps even essential, means of
support.172
The claimant in Norman argued that her nonmarital relationship was the equivalent of a marriage for purposes of determining "good cause." In Marvin v. Marvin,I73 the California Supreme Court held that a non married partner in a relationship
has a valid cause of action against her partner where the complaining partner can show that an express or implied agreement
exists between them and that a breach of that agreement has
169. Norman, 34 Cal. 3d at 8, 663 P.2d at 909, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (quoting CAL.
ADMIN. CODE, tit. 22, R. 1256-9 (1980».
170. Because the regulations are published by the administrative agency and not the
legislature, they are not direct evidence of legislative intent. However, they are given
great weight in the court's determination of legislative intent. Judson Steel Corp. v.
Workers' Compo Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 658, 668, 586 P.2d 564, 570, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250,
256 (1978).
171. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 22, R. 1256-12 (1980).
172. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
173. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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occurred. Citing several cases which limit the application of
Marvin/ 7• the Norman court stated that Marvin applies only to
a contractual or quasi-contractual agreement regarding the
property rights as to each party when the relationship terminates. In dicta, the Marvin court stated: "The structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and
nothing we have said in this ,opinion should be taken to derogate
from that institution."l75 Therefore, stated the court in Norman,
it is left for the legislature to determine whether all Marvin-like
relationships should be generally afforded the extensive statutory protections given to legal marriages. In the absence of such
legislation, the Norman court refused to characterize the relationship in the instant case as one deserving Marvin protection.
In Department of Industrial Relations v. Workers' Compo
Appeals Bd.,176 the court of appeal held that a nonmarital partner is entitled to death benefits consistent with Labor Code section 3503.177 Section 3503 provides in relevant part: "No person
is a dependent of any deceased employee unless in good faith a
member of the family or household of the employee . . . . "
Claimant in the instant case argued that Department of Industrial Relations is applicable to her case insofar as it allowed a
nonmarital partner to collect benefits under a statute which, like
section 1256, did not expressly Ihnit those benefits to married
persons.
Distinguishing Department of Industrial Relations, the
Norman court pointed out that the unmarried partner in Department of Industrial Relations was expressly provided for
under section 3503 because section 3503 requires only a showing
of good faith family participation and some dependency on the
deceased employee. Therefore, the Norman court concluded that
174. See generally In re Cummings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 640 P.2d 1101, 180 Cal. Rptr.
826 (1982) (prohibiting nonmarital partner from overnight visitations with an inmate).
People v. Delph, 94 Cal. App. 3d 411, 156 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1979) (refusal to extend the
marital communications privilege to nonmarital partners); Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft
Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1982) (Surviving nonmarital partner prohibited from bringing wrongful death action on behalf of deceased partner).
175. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
176. 94 Cal. App. 3d 72, 156 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979).
177. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3503 (Deering Supp. 1984).
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Department of Industrial Relations was inapposite and pointed
out that claimant's right to collect was not expressly granted
under section 1256. However, as pointed out by the dissent, section 1256 no more excludes unmarried persons than does section
3505. Section 1256 simply states that "good cause" must be
shown for leaving employment, and the related regulations only
create a presumption of "good cause" where marriage or imminent marriage are present. The majority's analysis denies claimant any opportunity to prove good cause even without taking
advantage of the presumption. The Norman court has effectively
precluded all those who have close and ongoing nonmarital relationships from being able to establish "good cause" for voluntarily terminating employment to relocate with a significant other,
except where marriage is "imminent." The court cited public
policy favoring marriage as its rationale; however, it is not clear
that the policy would be undermined by allowing unmarried
parties with no marital plans to prove "good cause." To deny
them the right to attempt such proof is to penalize them for
their nonmarital relationship by taking away a right which is
available to others under section 1256. As pointed out by the
dissent, the trial court did not apply the presumption which the
regulations afford married individuals. Instead, it made a legal
finding that claimant had established "good cause." The Supreme Court's decision in Norman denies claimant the right to
establish "good cause" under section 1256, even without benefit
of the presumption. If Norman stands for the proposition that
nonmarital couples whose marriage is not imminent have no
chance of establishing "good cause," presumptions aside, then
the court has rendered the legislatively created opportunity to
establish "good cause" virtually meaningless in many situations
in which parties need to relocate in order to be near someone for
whom they love and care.
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